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ABSTRACT
FirstAmendmentdoctrineisatitscoreaboutthecorrectresponsetothefactthatspeech
can increase the risk of social harm. First Amendment risk varies along several dimen-
sions, including distribution of risk, its magnitude, and the magnitude of social beneﬁt.
After describing several cases in which the Supreme Court’s assessment risk or harm
seems mistaken, I describe the tendency over time for courts to replace doctrine articu-
lated as standards with doctrine articulated as rules with exceptions. I explain why that
tendency occurs and can be normatively justiﬁed, but that it can produce pathologies
whenthecourtsresist,foravarietyofreasons,theproliferationofexceptionstotherules.
1. INTRODUCTION
Speech can directly inﬂict harm, and can increase the risk that harm will occur.
False statements about a person’s life can injure that person’s reputation, to the
point where the person might lose a job. Speech vigorously criticizing a gov-
ernment policy can increase the risk that some people will take unlawful actions
that interfere with the government’s ability to implement that policy. Such
speech can increase the likelihood that the government will abandon the
policy, and adopt one that promotes social welfare to a lesser extent. First
Amendment doctrine is at its core about the correct response to the fact that
speech can increase the risk of social harm.
Like all risks, First Amendment risk varies along several dimensions, of which
I will focus on three.
2 Risk can be distributed broadly or in a more focused way:
criticisms of government policy increase the risk that large numbers of people
1 William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, USA.
E-mail: mtushnet@law.harvard.edu. I thank John Goldberg, Robert Kagan, and participants in
the Workshop on Public Law at Harvard Law School for helpful comments on an earlier version
of this Essay.
2 I do not focus on the mechanism by which risk can be realized, for example by persuasion, or
through psychological mechanisms that are thought to bypass cognitive professes, or through the
reaction by those who disagree with the speech. Variation in these mechanisms explains some
aspects of judicial doctrine, in ways that I explore in connection with variation along other
dimensions.
TheAuthor2012.PublishedbyOxfordUniversityPressonbehalfofTheJohnM.OlinCenterforLaw,EconomicsandBusiness
at Harvard Law School.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0), which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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 will bear the social losses attendant on law-breaking, whereas real threats to
identiﬁed individuals primarily increase the risk that those individuals will be
attacked.
3 Risks can vary in magnitude as well: an anonymous pamphlet by a
puny anonymity, to adopt one of Justice Holmes’s phrases (Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)), increases the risk of
law-breaking by a small amount; a speech by a person with great oratorical skills
might increase the risk more.
4 The circumstances under which words are
uttered may affect the magnitude of the risk they impose.
5 And, ﬁnally,
speech varies in the magnitude of the social beneﬁt it occasions: as the Court
put it, some utterances are of low social value in their contribution to the
discovery of truth or the development of public policy (Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). In Justice Stevens’s words, “though
the First Amendment protects communication in th[e] area [of ‘Speciﬁed
Sexual Activities’] from total suppression”, “few of us would march our sons
and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see” such activities
(Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)).
To this point I have put my points as assertions about what speech does. But,
a more precise formulation is required to understand free speech doctrine as a
response to risk. Each of the assertion I have made should be prefaced with the
phrase, “Democratically elected legislatures reasonably believe....” So, for ex-
ample, First Amendment questions arise when democratically elected legisla-
tures reasonably believe that speech of a particular sort causes a speciﬁc kind of
harm that they believe to be distributed in a particular way.
6 Consideration of
the institutional relationship between courts and legislatures is more central to
3 Or increase the likelihood that they will take precautions against attack. Here too I forgo discussion
of the argument that real threats do more than increase risk but upon their communication directly
inﬂict harm by instilling fear in their target. This latter effect can perhaps be understood as an
assertion that the communication of a real threat in itself increases the risk of harm to 100%.
4 The implicit reference is to Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
5 Again, Holmes: “When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men ﬁght, and that no
Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919).
6 Two observations about this formulation: (i) Legislation can be challenged on the ground that the
belief that it addresses some identiﬁable harm is unreasonable. But, such a challenge should be
understood as resting on general libertarian principles (substantive due process, or a reasonableness
test applicable to all legislation) rather than on the First Amendment. (ii) The formulation is ap-
plicable to legal rules imposing liability pursuant to the common law, on two theories: (a) In most
states the judges who develop the common law are elected or at least subject to retention elections,
and (b) common law rules not displaced by state legislation, as they always can be, can be taken to
have the implicit endorsement of the democratically elected legislature. I believe that the latter of
these theories is the stronger one, but nothing much in what follows turns on it. (A more complete
account would address the claim that state legislatures might have incentives to address some
104 ~ Tushnet: The First Amendment and Political Risk
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 analyzing judicially developed free speech doctrine than is a direct assessment of
risk, its magnitude and distribution, and the social beneﬁts of speech. Courts
cannot completely avoid such direct assessments, but after they make a rough
judgment about these matters, they must consider the institutional question of
whether, and more important how, they should respond when their assessments
differ from the legislature’s. So, for example, how should a court respond when
a legislature reasonably believes that speech made in connection with a com-
mercial transaction increases the risk that social insurance schemes will pay too
much to compensate consumers for their purchases (and mechanisms other
than regulating the speech are less effective in reducing that risk)? The answer
does not lie primarily in improving the courts’ estimates of risk and the like,
though that might help, but in judicial doctrine predicated on judgments of
differential institutional competence.
Vince Blasi’s classic article, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment (1985), argued that First Amendment doctrine rested on the ac-
curate view that courts could reliably identify certain pathologies in the legis-
lative process that predictably generated systematically excessive legislative
assessments of the degree to which speech increased the risk of harm. For
Blasi, First Amendment doctrine should be structured by those pathologies:
For each pathology there should be a doctrine that corrected the excessive
estimate of the risk of harm.
7 Courts could then determine whether the regu-
lation the legislature adopted was an appropriate response to the risk of harm
accurately assessed.
8
This article addresses a different pathology, located in the judicial branch
rather than the legislative one. I motivate the argument by describing several
cases in which the courts’ assessment of the risk that speech causes harm seems
common law rules—for example, on products liability—but not others, such as the tort of inten-
tional inﬂiction of emotional distress.)
7 Some pathologies might be quite general. So, for example, John Hart Ely’s perception that legisla-
tures will overestimate the risk that criticism of their policies will undermine the policies’ effective
implementation seems to be a pathology applicable to all legislative policies, and so to all legislative
regulation of speech critical of government policy. Other pathologies might generate speciﬁc ways in
which legislatures overestimated risk, so doctrine responsive to one pathology might be inappro-
priate with respect to another.
8 My view is that Blasi’s analytic structure is that the First Amendment identiﬁes and rectiﬁes legis-
lative pathologies, and that due process rationality requirements apply to the evaluation of legislative
policies with that rectiﬁcation in hand. I need not argue here, though, that other understandings of
Blasi’s analytic structure are inferior to mine. Speciﬁcally, for present purposes it does not matter if
one wants to say that First Amendment doctrine has two components, the identiﬁcation and rec-
tiﬁcation of legislative pathologies, and in addition the constitutional evaluation of legislative
policies with an accurate assessment of the risk that speech will cause harm in hand.
Spring 2012: Volume 4, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 105
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 mistaken,
9 either because the courts seem to be mistaken in thinking that the
legislature’s estimates of the risk of harm are excessive (a phenomenon that I
will sometimes describe as a judicial underestimation of the risk of harm, to
parallel Blasi’s concern that legislatures overestimate harm), or because the
courts are insensitive to questions about the distribution of harm.
10 In con-
junction with that description I offer a diagnosis of the judicial pathology,
which, following Duncan Kennedy, I call the rule-iﬁcation of doctrine, that
is, the tendency over time for courts to replace doctrine articulated in the
form of standards with doctrine articulated in the form of rules with excep-
tions.
11 I explain why that tendency occurs and can be normatively justiﬁed, but
that it can produce pathologies when the courts resist, for a variety of reasons,
the proliferation of exceptions to the rules. I conclude with a discussion of the
obvious treatment, given that diagnosis—the injection of standards into the
rule-iﬁed system. I observe, though, that such an injection might not occur for
the reasons that lead courts to rule-ify, and that in any event the tendency to
rule-iﬁcation will assert itself even after an injection of standards.
12
9 For present purposes I set aside the possibility that the decisions rest on simple value disagreements
between other law-makers (legislatures, state court judges, juries) and the Court’s majority, because
(i) the Court’s opinions are not cast in terms of such disagreements, and (ii) such disagreements are
generally regarded as inappropriate grounds for constitutional doctrine (however often they might
be the actual grounds).
10 At some points I discuss the courts’ constitutional evaluation of rules developed by other courts
acting in their common-law capacity. Given his central concerns, Blasi sensibly did not treat
common-law rules separately from legislatively enacted ones. The pathologies he identiﬁed are
not directly applicable to common-law courts. Perhaps we might elide the differences by observing
that legislatures’ ability to modify common-law rules might justify attributing common-law rules to
legislatures that failed to modify or repeal the common-law rules. See supra note 6. I note, though,
that the real-world processes for adopting legislative policy and repealing or modifying judicial
policy are different enough that we should not assume without detailed argument that the pathol-
ogies that affect the former processes affect the latter in the same way or to the same degree. Learned
Hand suggested that judges were subject to the same pathologies in his comment on the inadequacy
of Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test, which he regarded as leaving too much discretion in the
hands of “Tomdickandharry, D.J.”, observing that “the Nine Elder Statesmen have not shown
themselves wholly immune from the ‘herd instinct’” common to legislators and jurors. Cited in
Gunther (1975, 749).
11 I believe I take the term from Kennedy, but neither he nor I can locate an original source. In a private
communication Robert Kagan suggested an alternative term, such as “hard” rule-iﬁcation, to dis-
tinguish the concept presented here from another prevalent in a different literature, on the prolif-
eration of rules regulating some deﬁned subject matter. I have chosen “rule-iﬁcation” for ease of
exposition.
12 Rule-iﬁcation is a general form of acontextual decision making of the sort Paul Horwitz explores in
his forthcoming book on First Amendment institutions.
106 ~ Tushnet: The First Amendment and Political Risk
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 2. THE PROBLEMS
I begin by describing several recent constitutional controversies in the United
States, which I treat as the symptoms of the pathology I am interested in: (i)
Snyder v. Phelps, the funeral protest case; (ii) United States v. Stevens, the “ani-
mal crush video” case. (iii) Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., involving state limitations
on the ability of druggists to sell information about prescriptions to drug
companies, which use that information to target speciﬁc doctors for their
sales efforts.
13
2.1. Distribution of Harms and Snyder v. Phelps
2.1.1 Description
Snyder v. Phelps is the well-known “funeral protest” case (131 S.Ct. 1207
(2011)). Members of the Westboro Baptist Church believe that the deaths of
U.S. soldiers in combat express God’s judgment that the United States has
become sinful because of its toleration of homosexuality. They express that
belief by engaging in demonstrations near soldiers’ funerals, at which they
display signs such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers”, “Fags Doom Nations”,
and “You’re Going to Hell”. They held one such demonstration just before the
burial of Matthew Snyder, who had been killed in Iraq. They displayed their
signs at a place where they were entitled to be, about 1000 feet from the church
where the funeral was held.
14 Snyder’s father sued the Westboro church mem-
bers for the tort of intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress. He had seen only
the tops of their signs but not the signs’ content as he drove to the funeral, but
learned of the content when he saw a television news broadcast about the
demonstration. Instructed that liability required that it ﬁnd that the
Westboro church members “intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme
and outrageous conduct that caused [Snyder] to suffer severe emotional dis-
tress”, the jury returned a multi-million dollar judgment against the church
members.
In 1988, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment barred recovery
for intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress on a public ﬁgure (Hustler
13 There is some overlap between this article and Schauer (forthcoming). Schauer focuses on the three
cases dealt with here, emphasizes that, unlike some classic cases, they are ones in which legislators
(and sometimes jurors) could reasonably believe that the proscribed actions caused signiﬁcant social
harm, and discusses some aspects of the distributional issues I discuss as well.
14 A subsequently enacted state law prohibits demonstrations within 100 feet of funerals. The
Westboro church members’ demonstration would not have been unlawful under that statute. See
131 S.Ct. at 1218 n. 5.
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a
t
 
E
r
n
s
t
 
M
a
y
r
 
L
i
b
r
a
r
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
M
u
s
e
u
m
 
C
o
m
p
 
Z
o
o
l
o
g
y
,
 
H
a
r
v
a
r
d
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
o
n
 
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
 
2
,
 
2
0
1
2
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
j
l
a
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)).
15 In Snyder v. Phelps the Court
extended this rule to cover actions ﬁled by private ﬁgures, where the speech was
“of public...concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case” (131
S. Ct. at 1215). The Court did assert that its holding was “limited by the par-
ticular facts before us” (id. 1220), but under its analysis those facts were relevant
only to the determination of whether the church members’ speech was on a
matter of public concern,
16 which it clearly was.
17
The Court chose the “matters of public concern” rule because, in its view, the
constraints on jury discretion embodied in the instructions—“severe harm”,
“outrageous and extreme” behavior, and (in my view most important) that the
behavior be “intentional”—failed adequately to take both public beneﬁt and
private harm into account. As I understand the Court’s opinion, the difﬁculty
with the instructions is that they are too complicated.
18 A rule that precludes
recovery for statements on matters of public concern is certainly simpler than
one allowing recovery under some rather limited circumstances. Yet, I ﬁnd it
unclear why simplicity should control, at least where the statements were made
intentionally, which I understand to mean, in the present context, made for the
very purpose of inﬂicting harm (in addition to contributing to discussion of a
matter of public concern).
19 I do not ﬁnd it obvious that a rule allowing the
15 There a pornographic magazine had published a “parody” advertisement, labeled as such, saying
that the “ﬁrst time” the prominent political preacher Jerry Falwell had had intercourse was in a
drunken incestuous encounter with his mother. Falwell, not his mother, ﬁled the action.
16 See also 131 S.Ct. at 1218 footnote 4 (“The fact that Westboro conducted its picketing adjacent to a
public street does not insulate the speech from liability, but instead heightens concerns that what is
at issue is an effort to communicate to the public the church’s views on matters of public concern.”).
This shows that the location is relevant not as part of a general assessment of all the circumstances,
but only to the determination of whether the speech was on a matter of public concern. I think it is
an interesting question: Why is it permissible to take the circumstances into account in determining
whether the speech is about a matter of public concern but not with respect to the broader question
of whether regulating the speech was justiﬁed by the balance of harms and beneﬁts?
17 The Court conceded the possibility that a few of the signs, which used the word “You”, might have
been taken to be references to Matthew Snyder as an individual, but stated, correctly in my view, that
“the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader public
issues.” Id. at 1217.
18 For my discussion of the possibility that the “outrageousness” standard raises questions of de facto
viewpoint-discrimination, see text accompanying note 26 infra.
19 Were there some ambiguity about the interpretation of the terms “intentionally or recklessly” in the
jury instructions, the Court could have stated that recovery was possible only where the jury con-
cludes that the statements were made for the very purpose of inﬂicting harm, and vacated the
judgment on the ground that the instructions did not conform to that requirement. See also 131
S. Ct. at 1223 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“When grave injury is intentionally inﬂicted by means of an
attack like the one at issue here, the First Amendment should not interfere with recovery.”).
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 imposition of liability for statements on matters of public concern made for the
very purpose of inﬂicting emotional harm (and succeeding in that purpose)
would “stiﬂe public debate” in a manner inconsistent with the choices “we”
have made in the First Amendment.
2.1.2 Critique
Chief Justice Roberts closed his opinion in the funeral protest case with this
paragraph:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of
both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inﬂict great pain. On the
facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.
As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stiﬂe public debate.
That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its
picketing in this case (131 S.Ct. at 1220).
The distributional question is apparent here: “We have chosen...to pro-
tect...hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stiﬂe
public debate.” The public beneﬁts from the debate, but the victim bears the
harms.
How should we think about the Court’s argument? I divide my discussion
into two parts: (i) Whether the Court should adopt a rule, and (ii) What rule the
Court should adopt. This section addresses the ﬁrst question, with some dis-
cussion of the second; later sections address the second.
The Court adopts a rule that a victim cannot recover for a speaker’s
intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress if the vehicle for inﬂicting that dis-
tress is a comment on a matter of public concern. Consider an alternative,
suggested indeed by the Court’s expressions of sympathy for the damage the
victim suffered in Snyder.
20 The Court could make a case-speciﬁc all-things-
considered judgment about whether, taking everything into account, the pub-
lic beneﬁt of the protester’s speech outweighed the harm inﬂicted on the
victim.
21 Assume that the Court’s expressions of sympathy mean that, had it
20 “Westboro’s choice to convey its views in conjunction with Matthew Snyder’s funeral made the
expression of those views particularly hurtful to many, especially to Matthew’s father. The record
makes clear that the applicable legal term—‘emotional distress’—fails to capture fully the anguish
Westboro’s choice added to Mr Snyder’s already incalculable grief.” Id. at 1217–1218.
21 A more common term, though less transparent, is “ad hoc balancing”. I note that case-speciﬁc
all-things-considered judgments have no precedential effect: the next similar case will be evaluated
according to its own facts, without reference to those in the ﬁrst one.
Spring 2012: Volume 4, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 109
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 made such a judgment, it would have upheld the liability award.
22 Why would
the Court abjure making that judgment in favor of the “matters of public
concern” rule?
The usual argument is that rules are better than case-speciﬁc all-things-
considered judgments when invoking the rule in all the cases to which it applies
produces a better set of results than the results produced by case-speciﬁc
all-things-considered judgments. But, this argument needs unpacking. Were
the Court in a position to make case-speciﬁc all-things-considered judgments
in every relevant case (that is, in every case in which a jury imposed liability for
intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress), such judgments would necessarily
be better than those produced by applying the “matters of public concern”
rule.
23 My sense is that there are relatively few such cases,
24 which suggests that
there might be no need for a rule of any sort.
25
Suppose, though, that the Court believes that it is not in a position to review
all cases in which liability is imposed. It could direct those who will effectively
make the ﬁnal decision—those who I will call the Court’s “targets”—either to
make case-speciﬁc all-things-considered judgments, or it could direct them to
follow some rule, in which event it will have to determine what rule the targets
should follow. To simplify exposition, I will identify the targets in IIED cases as
the judges who develop the instructions given to juries in such cases.
26 A rule
22 I note the possibility that these expressions of sympathy were designed to take the sting out of the
Court’s ruling, explaining that a result that might seem harsh to the uninformed is actually justiﬁed
when seen in some larger frame.
23 Because the only effect of such a rule is, as in Snyder v. Phelps, to deny recovery in cases whether the
case-speciﬁc all-things-considered judgment is that liability is appropriate.
24 Zipursky (2011) provides an overview of the common law IIED tort, generally supportive of the
observation in the text. Zipusky also notes that cases involving IIED in connection with funerals
form a reasonably well-deﬁned subset in the IIED universe, which suggests to me that recognizing
liability in Snyder would not interfere with speech on matters of public concern outside that speciﬁc
setting. (Zipursky’s article was largely completed before the Curt decided Snyder, but it contains a
“Postscript” on the Court’s decision.)
25 Note that the analysis would be different if a victim could claim that his or her constitutional rights
were violated by a failure to impose liability for intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress, because
the relevant set of cases would then include all IIED cases. European human rights law, which
generally recognizes a constitutional right to the protection of human dignity, might be a model,
and the case for rules would accordingly be stronger in such a system. But, in the United States
victims cannot generally claim that failure to ﬁnd liability violates their constitutional rights, and so
the relevant set of cases is as described in the text.
26 I believe that the analysis would be the same were the targets identiﬁed as the juries who impose
liability (because juries do so according to instructions given them by judges). I note, though, that
juries might be susceptible to their own pathology—roughly, a systematic tendency to ﬁnd liability
when the victims are socially valued people (and the speakers socially disvalued ones), and not when
the victims are socially disvalued and the speakers valued. Cf. Snyder, 131 S.Ct. at 1219
(“‘Outrageousness’...is a highly malleable standard”, and its application raises an “unacceptable”
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 would be appropriate if the Court could not trust those judges to make the
correct case-speciﬁc all-things-considered judgments, where “correctness” is
deﬁned as matching the judgments the Court would make were it to review
all the lower court decisions.
27 And, perhaps the Court might properly lack such
trust, because those judges are less able to make “good” case-speciﬁc
all-things-considered judgments.
28 A rule would then be appropriate.
29
What rule, though? For present purposes, there are two candidates. One
would allow liability where juries found that “the defendant intentionally or
recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused the plaintiff
risk of suppressing “‘“vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasant[]”’” statements.”). The ques-
tion of viewpoint discrimination is, I think, a bit more complex in the context of common-law
actions for intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress than in the usual context of statutory regu-
lations. The problem is one of underinclusiveness: people who intentionally inﬂict emotional dis-
tress in an outrageous manner on socially favored groups will be held liable while those who
intentionally inﬂict emotional distress on socially disfavored ones will not. But, those held liable
have no real claim that they are being treated wrongly, having themselves inﬂicted harm. The usual
justiﬁcation for ﬁnding underinclusiveness troublesome is that doing so encourages law-makers to
be more careful in deﬁning liability standards, and that greater care—meaning, in the present
context, willingness to deﬁne such standards in ways that will lead to imposing liability on those
who harm members of socially disfavored groups—might lead law-makers to eliminate the possi-
bility of liability altogether. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding unconstitu-
tional as viewpoint discriminatory, an ordinance punishing as hate speech, a subcategory of ﬁghting
words deﬁned with reference to the group characteristics of the speech’s target). Yet, ﬁnding a rule
unconstitutional for underinclusiveness is strong medicine, and one would want to be reasonably
sure that liability standards could not be reﬁned to reduce the risk of viewpoint discrimination. That
assurance would come from a careful examination, forgone in Snyder, of the jury instructions taken
as a whole.
27 A note on another possible target—the Supreme Court itself in the future—is probably appropriate
here. For reasons I develop in more detail elsewhere (Tushnet 1997), I doubt that future Courts are
sensibly treated as potential targets for rules. Brieﬂy: today’s Court cannot ensure that its successor
will follow the rule it sets out, rather than distinguish or in the extreme overrule it, unless it (x)
accurately believes that successor Courts will be less talented in distinguishing and other techniques
of legal analysis than it itself is and (y) accurately believes that successor Courts will recognize their
lower level of talent and act on that recognition. My view is that condition (y) will almost never be
satisﬁed.
28 The selection processes for lower courts (elections in most states, a patronage-inﬂuenced process in
many states and the federal system) compared to the high-attention process for Supreme Court
justices suggests that the average quality of lower courts will be lower than the quality of judges on
the Supreme Court (although the small number of Supreme Court justices suggests that variance
might be higher there). Concretely, lower courts are better targets for rules than successor Courts
because the former are less likely than the latter to develop rationales for distinguishing prior
decisions that “feel” satisfying to well-socialized lawyers.
29 Notably, the strongest justiﬁcation for the Court’s stringent rules for allowing criminal punishment
for speech lies precisely in the judgment the Court reached over time that even juries given instruc-
tions that appeared to conﬁne their decisions quite a bit would too often ﬁnd liability, and that lower
court judges were disinclined to refuse to submit cases to juries unless the judges’ discretion were
quite tightly conﬁned.
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 to suffer severe emotional distress”.
30 The jury is not asked to make a
case-speciﬁc all-things-considered-judgment; rather, it is asked to ﬁnd that
the defendant’s actions were intentional or reckless, extreme and outrageous,
and caused severe harm. The other allows liability where the defendant satisﬁes
all those requirements, but only with respect to statements that were not com-
ments on matters of public concern. The relevant question then is: which of
these rules produces a set of results that better matches the results the Court
itself would reach were it to make case-speciﬁc all-things-considered judgments
in the cases it is unable to review?
The distributional question does not disappear when the question is properly
formulated, because the right answer might be that the Court’s “matters of
public concern” rule is better than the rules embedded in the IIED tort (“bet-
ter”, again, deﬁned with reference to the case-speciﬁc all-things-considered
judgments the Court would make). I can only express my sense that the rules
embedded in the tort probably conﬁne liability tightly enough that the harm
inﬂicted in cases where properly instructed juries ﬁnd liability probably does
outweigh the public beneﬁt of the speaker’s comments.
31 Whatever one’s views
on the alternatives, it remains true that the Court—consistent with its course of
rule-iﬁcation—chose a simpler over a more complex rule.
2.2. Magnitude of Harms and United States v. Stevens
2.2.1 Description
United States v. Stevens held unconstitutional a federal statute making the pro-
duction of “animal snuff ﬁlms” illegal (130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010)).
32 Defending the
statute, the government argued that such ﬁlms were not covered by the First
Amendment based on the description of uncovered categories of speech in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (315 U.S. 568 (1942)). According to the unani-
mous Court in Chaplinsky, “There are certain well deﬁned and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and ob-
scene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘ﬁghting’ words....” (id.
571–572). The Chaplinsky Court continued with an explanation of why speech
30 These are the requirements for ﬁnding liability under Maryland law as applied in Snyder v. Phelps.
131 S.Ct. at 1215.
31 I note, though, that the “outrageousness” component of the IIED tort might be particularly sus-
ceptible to the kind of as-applied disparate impact noted above, note 26 supra. My sense is that the
component could be tweaked to reduce that possibility, so that the results under a reﬁned deﬁnition
of the tort would better match the case-speciﬁc all-things-considered judgments the Court would
reach. But, in any event, I believe that it is that question on which the better analysis should focus.
32 The following ﬁve paragraphs are adapted from Tushnet 2011.
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 in these classes was not covered: because the words “are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
beneﬁt that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality” (id. 572).
In Stevens the government argued that this explanation was as applicable to
animal snuff ﬁlms as it was to the previously identiﬁed “classes of speech”. The
reason for treating those classes of speech as outside the First Amendment’s
coverage being equally applicable to animal snuff ﬁlms, the prohibition of
animal snuff ﬁlms should not be “thought to raise any Constitutional
problem”.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the rest of the Court save Justice Alito,
rejected the government’s argument. According to the Chief Justice, “Our
Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment [about the social
beneﬁts and costs of First Amendment protection] simply on the basis that
some speech is not worth it” (Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1585). Yet, Chaplinsky shows
that there are some categories of speech that are not covered by the First
Amendment “on the basis that some speech”—ﬁghting words, obscenity,
and the other enumerated categories—“is not worth it”. And, the government
contended that animal snuff ﬁlms ﬁt into the generalized description of un-
covered categories Chaplinsky offered.
The Chief Justice responded to the government’s argument by denying that
the reasons Chaplinsky offered for the categories’ exclusion from coverage were
relevant to the fact of their exclusion. Those reasons, according to the Chief
Justice, were merely “descriptive”, not justiﬁcatory, and so were irrelevant (id.
1586). What mattered was the seemingly prefatory comment in Chaplinsky, that
these categories “had never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”.
The Chief Justice said that those categories were to be determined by a purely
historical test: uncovered categories were those “that have been historically
unprotected” (id.). The reasons for the exclusion that Chaplinsky gave were
irrelevant. The only uncovered categories of speech, according to this argument,
are those that have been held to be uncovered from the time of the Framing.
33
To the extent that the Court offered a defense of choosing the historical
rather than the functional interpretation of Chaplinsky, it relied on a
common but misleading trope in recent decisions. As the Chief Justice
33 The Chief Justice introduced a purely ad hoc exception to the historical test for the recently
recognized category of child pornography, a category that includes material that would not ﬁt the
Court’s deﬁnition of obscenity. According to the Chief Justice, child pornography could be pro-
hibited because “[t]he market for child pornography was ‘intrinsically related’ to the underlying
abuse, and was therefore ‘an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal
throughout the Nation’” Id. (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 759, 761 (1982).
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 interpreted the government’s argument, it offered a “free-ﬂoating test for First
Amendment coverage”, in which “[w]hether a given category of speech enjoys
First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing of the value
of the speech against its societal costs” (130 S. Ct. at 1585). That “startling and
dangerous” proposition had to be rejected because “[t]he First Amendment
itself reﬂects a judgment by the American people that the beneﬁts of its restric-
tions on the Government outweigh its costs” (id.)
34 That, though, is unrespon-
sive to the government’s position. The issue in the case is: what are the
restrictions the First Amendment places on the government? Once we know
that the First Amendment covers a category of speech, of course we do not do
the balancing the Chief Justice describes, and for the reason he gives. But,
observing that covered speech is not subject to a balancing test tells us nothing
about what speech is covered.
35
The Court’s trope reﬂects what I have described elsewhere as a fear of judg-
ment (Tushnet 2009).
36 The Court adopts originalism in part to avoid the
judgments it thinks required by balancing and similar analyses. Yet, even ori-
ginalism cannot avoid judgments. The historical materials almost never deal
with the precise problem presented today. An originalist must therefore either
conﬁne himself or herself to what scholars have called the actually expected
applications of constitutional terms
37 or devise some method for analogizing
34 Id. For the trope’s use elsewhere, see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011) (“The
Constitution ‘does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.’ It does enact the First
Amendment.”); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (“the enshrinement of
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”). I note the possibility
that the trope has the effect of shifting responsibility for decision from the Court to the First
Amendment’s adopters. For a peculiar juxtaposition using the trope, see Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 420–421 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“we are presented with a clear and simple
statute to be judged against a pure command of the Constitution. The outcome can be laid at no
door but ours. The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make
them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them,
compel the result.”).
35 I think that the Chief Justice is able to write what he does because he engages in a transparent—and
therefore ineffective—sleight-of-hand. The government had argued for using a categorical balancing
approach to determine whether a category of speech is covered. The Chief Justice describes the
government’s position as asking for some sort of “ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and
beneﬁts” to determine whether a category of speech is covered. See also id. at 1586 (implicitly
rejecting the argument that Chaplinsky justiﬁes lack of coverage when “an ad hoc calculus of
costs and beneﬁts tilts in a statute’s favor”). Frankly, I simply cannot understand what the Chief
Justice means by this odd blend of categorical and ad hoc balancing.
36 I argue below that the fear of judgment reﬂected in the trope operates only a bit below the surface of
the Court’s decisions, and that seeing the Court as afﬁrmatively attracted to rule-iﬁcation provides a
deeper understanding of these decisions.
37 See Greene (2009, 662) (arguing that the difference between original meaning and original expected
application is “a question of the level of generality”).
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 such expected applications to the problem at hand. So, for example, in District
of Columbia v. Heller, the Court rejected as “bordering on the frivolous” the
argument that the “arms” that individuals had a right to bear were muskets and
the like (Heller, 554 U.S. at 582). Rather, the term referred (“prima facie”) to all
“bearable” weapons, and then to weapons in common use for purposes of
self-defense in cases of confrontation (id.). Drawing that conclusion required
the Court to identify the characteristics of the relevant weapons—common use,
self-defense, and the like. Yet, those weapons had other characteristics, such as
their accuracy, the degree to which they were lethal in the hands of those who
possessed them, which might in turn depend on the amount of training in
weapons use people generally had, and the like. Choosing the characteristics
treated as relevant requires the Court to exercise judgment, and, I think,
a judgment not different in the respects bearing on the Court’s fear of judg-
ment from that required by a functionalist interpretation of Chaplinsky’s
language.
38
Fear of judgment cannot support the Court’s choice of the historical over the
functionalist readings of Chaplinsky’s language.
39 I suggest below that the better
explanation lies in a different jurisprudential direction, one that points to the
relation between the Court as rule-deviser and other law-makers as
38 For another example, consider the exchange between Justices Alito and Scalia in the oral argument
of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011):
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I think what Justice Scalia wants to know is what James Madison
thought about video games.
JUSTICE SCALIA: No, I want to know what James Madison thought about violence.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, No. 98-1448 (Oct. Term
2010), p. 17. In the event Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, chose violence as the proper char-
acterization. Justice Thomas, though, argued forcefully that the proper characterization was some-
thing like “material to which the founding generation would have allowed children access without
their parents’ permission”. The disagreement between Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia shows that
originalists cannot avoid making some kinds of judgments, though of course different ones from
those that functionalists make.
39 A related possibility is that rule-iﬁcation reﬂects something like what Karl Llewellyn called a “period
style”, a characteristic mode of argument associated with a historical era and explicable, if at all, by
judicial preferences rooted in psychological and sociological grounds, the nature of which Llewellyn
left largely unexplored. For an exposition ofLlewellyn’s views on period-style, see Llewellyn 1960, 36.
If there is a period-style of rule-iﬁcation, one would expect to ﬁnd it expressed in other doctrinal
areas aswell. It may be worthnoting that Justice Alito resisted thepull ofrule-iﬁcation in Stevens and
Phelps, and that Justice Breyer does so generally (though not uniformly, as his agreement with the
outcome in Stevens indicates). These observations in turn suggest that we should be wary of
associating rule-iﬁcation with a speciﬁc political tendency. (That point has been made in connection
with the related distinction between rules and standards by, among others, Sullivan 1992.)
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 rule-devisers, and, because of that relation, a preference on the Court for what it
believes to be simple rather than complex analyses.
40
2.2.2 Critique
The IIED problem might be addressed through case-speciﬁc all-things-
considered judgments because the number of cases may well be small enough
to allow the Court to review them all. Other problems will clearly generate too
many cases to be dealt with directly. One alternative is category-based balan-
cing.
41 Here the Court identiﬁes a category of expression—ﬁghting words, hate
speech, obscenity, political discourse—and aggregates the social harms (the
increased risk of social harm) associated with all instances in that category,
aggregates the social beneﬁts similarly associated, and permits or prohibits
regulation depending on whether in its judgment the aggregated harms
exceed the aggregated beneﬁts.
The analytic structure for evaluating category-based balancing is similar to
that described above: were the Court in a position to make the category-speciﬁc
judgments with respect to every possible category, it should do so. But, legal
categories are not natural objects, and their proliferation depends primarily on
advocates’ skills.
42 Legislatures and lower courts will ﬁnd it relatively easy to
identify some new category of speech different from those the Court has pre-
viously recognized, and the Court will be unable to police those decisions
through direct review. Instead, it must provide criteria for determining when
a new category can be created.
That was the problem addressed in Stevens, the crush video case. To return to
the argument’s structure: the government contended that Chaplinsky provided
the criteria, in its statement that “There are certain well deﬁned and narrowly
limited classes of speech, [a] the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem....[S]uch utterances
40 For a brief discussion bearing on whether historical inquiries are indeed simpler than functional
ones at the level of trial and intermediate appellate courts, see note 49 infra. I am inclined to think
that they are not simpler even at the Supreme Court level, except in exceptional cases such as Heller,
where a large body of historically oriented scholarship was available to the Court. Of course, the
Court’s preference for historical inquiries may elicit relevant scholarship, thereby increasing the
accessibility of the material the Court treats as relevant, to both the Court and lower courts.
41 I substitute the term “balancing” for “all-things-considered judgment” here because making the
category the relevant unit of evaluation necessarily screens out some case-speciﬁc features of the
cases, and “all-things-considered with respect to the category” is too cumbersome.
42 For a good example, see Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S.Ct. 2729 (2011), where the
Court, through Justice Scalia, described the relevant category as “speech depicting violence,” and
Justice Thomas, in dissent, described it as “speech directed at minors without their parents’
consent”.
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 are [b] no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any beneﬁt that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality” (315 U.S. at 571–572).
According to the government, description [b] identiﬁed functional criteria for
determining when utterances were not within the First Amendment’s cover-
age.
43 The Court disagreed, holding that description [a] set out historical cri-
teria for making that determination.
44
Here we face the two questions described above: is a rule appropriate, and if
so, what should it be? The analytic structure is as before: identify the targets and
ask (i) whether they are likely to do worse than the Court in identifying relevant
categories, and (ii) whether, if so, they will do better using historical criteria or
functional criteria to identify categories. The ultimate target in Stevens is the
legislature, with lower courts as a more proximate target.
Blasi’s analysis suggests that we should address the ﬁrst question by asking
whether there is some pathology associated with the legislature’s identiﬁcation
of categories.
45 The inquiry into pathologies formally has two steps. First we ask
whether there is some pathology associated with the particular category the
legislature has created: is there some reason to think that the legislature has
overestimated the risks associated with the category of expression or under-
estimated its beneﬁts? If so, we proceed to the question of devising a rule to
guide the legislature’s creation of categories. If not, we then ask whether there is
some pathology associated with legislatures’ assessment of the existence of
categories of expression in toto: is there some reason to think that the legislature
is prone to overestimate risks or underestimate beneﬁts of a system of free
expression in which some categories of expression are excluded from the
First Amendment’s coverage (or, as commercial speech cases suggest, receive
less First Amendment protection than other categories do)? If so, we ask
whether the functional or the historical test is more likely to lead legislatures
43 For the distinction between coverage and protection, see Schauer 1981, 270–271.
44 Description [a], according to the Court, explained why the historical criteria made functional sense,
but did not displace a historical inquiry with a functional one.
45 For completeness, I note that a complete formulation would deal with two forms, one in which the
legislatures (pathologically) proscribe a category of speech and the other in which they identify a
category of speech and delegate to juries the decision about penalizing speech within that category.
As to the latter a pathology might affect the legislative decision to delegate or a different pathology
might predictably occur when juries decide. The distinction corresponds roughly to the
well-established distinction in First Amendment doctrine between Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), exemplifying the ﬁrst type, and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), exemplify-
ing the second. Yet a further complication is that Snyder v. Phelps shows that some analysis of
judicial pathologies would be required where state courts develop the common law. I hope that my
discussion in the text helps identify considerations that would be deployed in dealing with these
complexities.
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 to develop categories that match those the Court would choose were it in a
position to develop all the relevant categories.
According to Blasi, legislatures are prone to overestimate the risks associated
with speech critical of government policy, particularly in heated times. What of
the risks and beneﬁts associated with crush videos? For myself, I ﬁnd it difﬁcult
to identify a pathology that would lead to the overestimation of risks or under-
estimation of beneﬁts associated with the dissemination of such videos.
46
If that is right, we must then ask whether there is some pathology associated
with creating a system of expression in which some utterances are covered and
others are not.
47 The best candidate I have been able to devise is this:
understanding themselves to have the power to create categories of uncovered
expression, legislators will be tempted to respond to constituents’ concerns
about forms of expression the constituents ﬁnd particularly distasteful by seek-
ing to regulate the utterances without seriously considering whether the harms
caused by the utterances truly outweigh the social beneﬁts of their dissemin-
ation. This could be understood as a generalization of the “interest-group
capture” pathology: a system that allows legislatures to generate new categories
of un- or less-protected expression will prompt interest groups to pressure
legislatures to do so, and sometimes the legislatures will succumb to those
pressures.
48 For myself, I am again skeptical about this claim’s merit. But, the
Court’s choice between the “[a] and [b]” options in Stevens is defensible if the
Court accepted the claim, and for present purposes I do so as well.
As a ﬁrst approximation, I suggest that legislatures authorized to use a func-
tional approach will generate “better” categories—that is, those in which the
aggregated harms outweigh the aggregated beneﬁts, at least as the legislatures
evaluate those harms and beneﬁts—than will legislatures required to use a
historical one. They are likely to have access to relevant functional information,
which will come to them as they consider a wide range of policy questions,
46 A common claim is that interest-group capture produces a pathology relevant to First Amendment
analysis. Interest-group capture, it is thought, produces legislation that overestimates the harm
averted and the overall social beneﬁt provided by the statute, in the service of distributing gains
to the interest group. In Stevens an interest-group capture account of this sort does not seem
especially strong. Certainly animal-welfare groups favored the statute, not to gain competitive ad-
vantage against someone, but rather to advance their vision of what the public interest demands.
(The statute is Stevens was almost certainly overbroad under standard doctrine, but the interesting
question is whether the legislature could deﬁne a category that included the crush videos that were its
primary concern. I am quite conﬁdent that it could.)
47 Or, again, in which some categories receive more protection than others.
48 I put it in terms of “serious consideration” rather than “actually outweigh” because the argument’s
predicate is that the Court believes that the legislature will not do a good job (with “good” deﬁned as
above) in determining whether aggregated risks outweigh aggregated beneﬁts.
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 whereas they are unlikely to deal with historical questions in any setting other
than the one at issue.
49 But, for the same reason they are likely to generate more
categories using a functional than a historical approach. And, the more cate-
gories the more likely a mismatch between the legislatures’ evaluation of the
aggregated harms and beneﬁts and the Court’s. The Court’s choice in Stevens
would then be justiﬁed by a judgment that targets—legislatures, in the current
example—are more likely to get it right from the Court’s point of view if they
are instructed that they can develop a rule-system with a few broad rules and
only a few exceptions. The historical criterion [b]is on the surface an expression
of the Court’s commitment to originalism, but it operates more importantly to
induce the creation of a simple rule-set by reducing the number of legislatively
created exceptions. To that extent, some preference for the speciﬁc form that
rule-iﬁcation has taken might be justiﬁed.
2.3 Magnitude of Benefits and Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
2.3.1 Description
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. held unconstitutional a Vermont statute barring the
sale of certain pharmacy records to data-mining companies that intended to
resell them to pharmaceutical manufacturers (131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011)). Vermont
requires pharmacists to keep records of the prescriptions written by physicians,
classiﬁed by the doctors’ names. It barred the pharmacists from selling lists
showing the number of prescriptions for each drug written by each physician.
50
That restriction was limited to sales of the lists for marketing uses, and did not
preclude the pharmacists from selling the lists to those who intended to use
them for research.
51 Vermont believed that the ban would reduce medical costs
because it would make it more difﬁcult for manufacturers of expensive drugs,
typically those protected by patents, to identify doctors who were prescribing
similar but less expensive drugs. Drug manufacturers send “detailers” to visit
doctors to describe the beneﬁts of using the manufacturers’ drugs.
52 They ex-
plain why the substitutes the doctors are using might be less effective than the
drugs their employer makes, for example. Vermont’s legislators believed that
this sales technique induced doctors to switch from less to more expensive but
49 Though the Court’s adoption of the historical approach might induce interest groups and others to
supply legislatures with the required historical information.
50 As compiled by the pharmacists the lists did not identify the patients for whom the prescriptions
were written.
51 In dissent, Justice Breyer observed that the state’s ethics rules for pharmacies deﬁne release of
practitioner information “to unauthorized persons” as unprofessional conduct. 131 S. Ct. at 2680
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
52 For a journalistic account of this sales method, see Elliott (2010: ch. 3).
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 not more effective drugs, thereby increasing the cost of medical care. By making
it more difﬁcult for detailers to identify possible targets for their sales efforts,
the ban on selling information for use by drug manufacturers would help
control medical costs.
The Supreme Court held that Vermont’s ban violated the First Amendment
because it regulated speech—the dissemination of information lawfully
acquired by pharmacists—in a way that discriminated on the basis of both
content and speaker: the regulation “disfavors marketing, that is, speech with
a particular content” and “disfavors speciﬁc speakers, namely pharmaceutical
manufacturers” (131 S.Ct. at 2663). Even though the regulation dealt with
commercial speech, and even on the assumption that the information was
simply a commodity, the regulation was subject to heightened scrutiny because
it was not justiﬁed on some basis independent of the speech’s content or the
recipient’s identity. The Court noted that “the outcome is the same whether a
special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is
applied” (id. 2667). The state had “to show at least that the statute directly
advances a substantial governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to
achieve that interest” (id.). That standard “ensure[s] not only that the State’s
interests are proportional to the resulting burdens placed on speech but also
that the law does not seek to suppress a disfavored message” (id. 2668). Because
the regulation allowed researchers and journalists—an “almost limitless audi-
ence” (id.), in the Court’s words—access to physician-related information, the
regulation did little to protect physicians’ privacy. Doctors who did not like to
discuss their prescription practices with detailers could simply refuse to meet
with them. Nor was the connection between cost-control and the regulation
close enough. Under the regulation costs are controlled because detailers cannot
present doctors with accurate information that might lead them to choose to
prescribe more expensive drugs, perhaps mistakenly. But, “[t]hose who seek to
censor or burden free expression often assert that disfavored speech has adverse
effects” (id. 2670).
Justice Breyer in dissent offered a different characterization of the regulation.
Rather than a regulation of information lawfully acquired, Justice Breyer saw it
as “inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort to regulate a commercial
enterprise” (id. 2673 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). Much of his opinion was devoted
to an explication of what he saw as the Court’s traditional “test-related distinc-
tion[]” between regulations of commercial and noncommercial speech (id.
2674 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). According to Justice Breyer, regulations of
“expression inextricably related to” business regulations were almost inevitably
content and speaker based. As to content, regulated businesses engage in
many forms of communication—commercial advertisements, advertise-
ments on public policy proposals of interest to the businesses, securities
120 ~ Tushnet: The First Amendment and Political Risk
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 disclosures—but regulators will select only some of those, on the basis of their
content, for regulation.
53 And as to speaker-based regulations, regulators might
identify a speciﬁc subset of an industry where problems are especially severe and
impose requirements on manufacturers in that subset without imposing similar
regulations on others in the same industry.
54
As Justice Breyer’s opinion emphasized, Sorrell’s most problematic aspect is
its continuation of the Court’s trend to assimilate commercial speech to polit-
ical speech, subjecting both to demanding requirements for justiﬁcation, or, in
Justice Breyer’s words, an “unforgiving brand of ‘intermediate’ scrutiny...”
(id. 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). As the Court observed, Sorrell’s analysis fol-
lows the path marked by a series of cases in which the Court refused to distin-
guish sharply between commercial and other forms of protected speech,
asserting that whether the stringent tests for regulating non-commercial
speech or the supposedly less stringent tests for regulating commercial speech
were applied, the result would be the same.
55
Yet, at least on the surface the tests could produce different results. In Sorrell,
for example, the Court made much of the fact that everyone but pharmaceutical
manufacturers could use physician-identiﬁed prescription information. So, the
Court said, the information was available to “an almost limitless audience”.
Formally speaking, perhaps so. Listing all the possible users of such informa-
tion—pharmaceutical manufacturers, university researchers, journalists, any
interested citizen—the statute does indeed exclude only one group from
using the information. One might think, though, that the relevant question
was not the length of the list of possible users—which depends on the criteria
for determining how to enumerate users—but the likelihood that any potential
user would be interested in identifying speciﬁc physicians. The pharmaceutical
manufacturers of course were interested in doing so, and an occasional jour-
nalist might think it important to use a doctor’s name to bring to life some story
about prescription practices, but it is hardly clear that university researchers, or
anyone else, would think it important to do so. So, in practical terms, the
53 See 131 S.Ct. at 2677 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Electricity regulators, for example, oversee company
statements, pronouncements, and proposals, but only about electricity.”).
54 See id. at 2677 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“An energy regulator, for example, might require the manu-
facturers of home appliances to publicize ways to reduce energy consumption, while exempting
producers of industrial equipment.”); 2680 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (“The First Amendment does not require States to regulate for problems that do
not exist.”).
55 For earlier discussions, see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (refraining from
deciding whether the tests for commercial and non-speech were different because the regulations at
issue did not satisfy the nominally lower standard for permissible regulations of commercial speech);
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (providing a similar analysis).
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 regulation covered the vast bulk of those who might actually use the informa-
tion.
56 And, in doing so, it would do a reasonably good job—the kind of job the
nominal test for commercial speech demands—of promoting the government’s
permissible regulatory goal of protecting physician privacy.
Justice Breyer’s doctrinal alternative would preserve commercial speech as a
separate category for constitutional analysis, by allowing regulation of speech
inextricably bound up with lawfully regulated activities. This would make the
doctrinal structure a bit more complicated, but hardly beyond the capacity of
judges to apply.
57 A constitutional rule dealing with speech in connection with
lawfully regulated activities does not seem to me difﬁcult for legislatures to
apply, nor is it obviously subject to any more manipulation in the service of
narrow interest groups than is substantive regulation. The only justiﬁcation for
the Court’s assimilation of commercial to noncommercial speech seems to be a
preference for simplicity as such.
2.3.2 Critique
For thepresent I take thehistorical approach of Stevens as given. The conclusion
that categories of un- or less-protected speech should be identiﬁed through
historical rather than functional inquiry leaves open the question of how to
deﬁne the boundaries of those categories the Court ﬁnds have adequate histor-
ical support. And here, I believe, the preference for simplicity as such is more
difﬁcult to justify. The reason emerges when we consider the two possible
targets for the Court’s rules, legislatures and courts.
As to legislatures, the historical inquiry, as we have seen, inevitably generates
questions about the level of generality at which the historical inquiry should be
conducted. There will inevitably be insufﬁcient evidence to support a judgment
that a category of speech described at a sufﬁciently low level of generality—
described in relatively speciﬁc terms such as “violent video games”—has his-
torically been given no protection or less protection than other categories re-
ceive. The Court’s forays into the “level of generality” problem have not yielded
much in the way of clear doctrine.
58
56 See 131 S. Ct. at 2680 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The record contains no evidence that prescriber--
identifying information is widely disseminated.”); 2681 (“noting in the record indicates that any
‘counterdetailing’...has ever taken place in fact in Vermont.”).
57 The business of the “media” consists of selling information, and some of that information might
well be “in connection with lawfully regulated activities”. The courts would then have to develop an
exception to Justice Breyer’s rule for the media, which would introduce another degree of complex-
ity into the doctrinal structure.
58 One thing is clear: a purely historical inquiry cannot determine the level of generality at which the
historically determined categories should be described. Rather, some analysis, typically predicated
on a broader view of the proper scope of judicial review, is required. Consider here Justice Scalia’s
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 The historical inquiry might generate relatively few categories of un- or less-
protected speech, categories described in relatively general terms. Generality
means that deﬁning the precise boundaries of the categories will be the
Court’s—and the lower courts’—task. Once again, we have to ask whether
the Court will be in a position to police directly what the lower courts do
(probably not) and what rule or rules it could develop to ensure that the
lower courts’ actions conform to the Court’s judgment about the best set of
outcomes overall.
In Sorrell the candidate deﬁnitions are (i) no categorical exemption for com-
mercial speech,
59 (ii) “speech proposing a commercial transaction”,
60 and (iii)
“speech inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort to regulate a com-
mercial enterprise”.
61 I put aside the ﬁrst position simply because it is incon-
sistent with existing doctrine, including the doctrine at least nominally followed
in Sorrell. On the face of things, I ﬁnd it hard to distinguish between the
remaining possibilities, except perhaps on the ground that the traditional def-
inition is a bit simpler for lower courts to administer, though the difference in
simplicity seems to me small. The question then becomes whether the move
from a simple boundary-deﬁnition to a slightly more complex one is likely to
introduce more errors (from the Court’s point of view) than improvements in
the set of overall outcomes. That question, in turn, requires that we ask whether
the latter, slightly more complex deﬁnition would open the way for some path-
ology to operate at the legislative level. The thought would be that the “inex-
tricably incident” test would license a bad interest group dynamic.
Precisely what that dynamic would be is unclear. The legislature defended the
statute in Sorrell as a cost-containment technique aimed at practices by a per-
haps unpopular group, “Big Pharma”, and perhaps to the advantage of manu-
facturers of generic versions of out-of-patent prescription drugs. But, the
analysis elsewhere. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Justice Scalia, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
argued that in determining the level of generality at which traditional protections of family auton-
omy should be described, wrote, “We refer to the most speciﬁc level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identiﬁed.” 492 U.S. 110, 127 n. 6
(1989). The reason for selecting that level of generality is that it appropriately accommodates the
constitutional interest in protecting liberty to the states’ general regulatory power. Any higher level
of generality would, on this view, authorize the courts to invalidate “too many” legislative innov-
ations, thereby intruding on valuable experimentation, a potential engine of progress or at least
learning through self-government. I leave for discussion elsewhere whether or how this approach
could be used to deal with the problem of rule-iﬁcation, noting only that it would counsel in favor of
deﬁning categories in ways that licensed legislative experimentation and the like.
59 Described earlier as the libertarian position.
60 The deﬁnition offered in early commercial speech cases.
61 Justice Breyer’s deﬁnition.
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 interest-group story about Sorrell seems to me the kind of “just-so” story that
people make up when forced to ﬁt a statute enacted in pursuit of a vision,
contested to be sure, of the public interest, into a theory that calls for
interest-group explanations of all statutes.
62 Perhaps in other regulatory con-
texts, the “inextricably incident” test would lead to an obvious overestimation
of beneﬁts (or underestimation of costs) associated with interest-group capture.
But, my view is that the burden should have been on the Court to explain what
that dynamic would be before it rejected Justice Breyer’s test. Without such an
explanation, we are left with a preference for simplicity as such.
2.3.3 Conclusion
In each of these cases the Court reached counter-intuitive results from the
perspective of almost any foundational theory of the First Amendment. I
have treated these cases as “symptoms” of a judicial pathology. The symptoms
result, I suggest, from the form that rule-iﬁcation has taken in First Amendment
doctrine. The judicial and scholarly debate about the relative merits of rules and
standards is well-known and of long-standing. Rules provide clear guidance to
people charting their course of action, but they necessarily fail to take into
account normatively relevant features of actual cases. They are, in the jargon,
inevitably over and underinclusive with respect to their purposes. Standards are
better tailored to the circumstances, but for that reason are worse at providing
ex ante guidance, because actors cannot know what “the circumstances” will be
and, more important, what courts assessing their actions ex post will ﬁnd to the
“the circumstances”.
There is a long-standing scholarly tradition arguing that, as cases accumulate,
courts are driven to move from standards to rules. Experience accumulates, and
judges get familiar with some generic features of situations they repeatedly
confront. They become increasingly conﬁdent that they can devise rules that
capture so many of the normatively relevant features of those situations that the
beneﬁts of ex ante guidance from rules come to outweigh the beneﬁts of apply-
ing standards after the event.
Free speech doctrine in the United States has reached the point where rules
have generally replaced standards.
63 The pathology is not rule-iﬁcation in itself.
Rather, it is the decision to have an extremely simple rule-system. So, for
62 An alternative interest-group story pervades discusses of health care. In that story “Bog Pharma” is
the concentrated interest group that is able to “distort” legislative deliberations through campaign
contributions and the like. Those who offer the counter-story about Sorrell might be asked for
state-speciﬁc reasons explaining Big Pharma was unable to capture the Vermont legislature.
63 I note that Fredrick Schauer has argued that the European preference for standards over rules,
through the proportionality doctrine, arises from the relatively brief experience those courts have
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 example, in the funeral protest case, the Court held that the stringent standard
for allowing states to impose liability for intentionally inﬂicting emotional
distress on public ﬁgures should be used in cases involving the intentional
inﬂiction of emotional distress on ordinary, private people where the means
of inﬂicting the injury is through the “discussion” of public matters such as the
proper social response to homosexuality. And, in the crush video case, the
Court expressly limited the categories of speech outside the scope of the First
Amendment to a short list of categories historically recognized, not functionally
deﬁned.
Yet, the rules/exceptions/exceptions approach is actually quite standard.
64 In
another recently decided case, involving a regulation of legislative ethics, the
Court had no difﬁculty in ﬁnding that the act of casting a vote was not an
exercise of free speech—that is, was categorically excluded from the First
Amendment’s coverage (Nevada Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S.Ct.
2343 (2011)). This is the rule/exception model in action. Adding an exception
to the exception is hardly beyond the capacity of judges either, as the leading
U.S. decision on hate speech regulation shows.
65
So, the pathology is the use of a simple rule-set rather than a rule-set that
includes more elements. What accounts for that choice? The arguments roughly
parallel those in the rules-standards debate, though on a higher level. The
question is, Should a court take a rule-like approach to developing the rules
that regulate primary behavior, or should it take a standard-like approach? The
U.S. Supreme Court has pretty clearly chosen a rule-like approach to develop-
ing rules. In the seminal gun-rights/gun-control case the Court relied on ori-
ginalism—a rule-like method, in my terms—and derided Justice Breyer’s use of
a standard-like method. It similarly criticized the government’s attempt to
defend the crush video statute through what it variously described as a categor-
ical balancing or a simple balancing approach.
had with free speech problems, and has predicted that European jurisprudence will move in a more
rule-oriented direction over the next decades. Schauer 2003.
64 The Court’s opinion in Stevens struggled with the rules/exceptions/exceptions problem in its un-
successful effort to distinguish uncovered crush videos from covered child pornography by arguing
that, though child pornography (not ﬁtting the Court’s deﬁnition of obscenity) did not ﬁt within a
historically deﬁned category excepted from First Amendment coverage, coverage was justiﬁed be-
cause the production of child pornography was inextricable from child abuse, unlawful everywhere
in the country. The same could be said about crush videos and animal abuse.
65 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), an ordinance was held to violate the First
Amendment because it made people liable for ﬁghting words on the basis of the particular viewpoint
expressed through those words. The analytic structure is—Rule (“no viewpoint discrimination”)/
Exception (“ﬁghting words are outside the First Amendment’s coverage”)/Exception to exception
(“but not when the regulation is viewpoint-based”).
Spring 2012: Volume 4, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 125
 
a
t
 
E
r
n
s
t
 
M
a
y
r
 
L
i
b
r
a
r
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
M
u
s
e
u
m
 
C
o
m
p
 
Z
o
o
l
o
g
y
,
 
H
a
r
v
a
r
d
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
o
n
 
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
 
2
,
 
2
0
1
2
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
j
l
a
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 3. SOME ALTERNATIVES TO RULE-IFICATION
The Court has not given adequate reasons for preferring a simple rule-structure
to a slightly more complex one.
66 In other settings the Court sometimes ac-
knowledges that it is dealing with a relatively new phenomenon, as in a recent
decision involving how the prohibition of unreasonable searches applied to a
public employer’s examination of an employee’s text messages (City of Ontario
v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010)). When it does so, it generally says that it should
be cautious and apply either a narrow rule, a rule with many qualiﬁcations and
therefore possible exceptions, or a standard.
67
My sense is that the pathological cases I have described are “new” in the
relevant sense, although I confess that I have not ﬁgured out exactly why. But, if
that sense is right, the prescription is simple. The Court should de-rule-ify the
area, or, more precisely, accept an analytic structure with a reasonably thick set
of rules. Full de-rule-iﬁcation is straightforward. It would be the direct appli-
cation of a proportionality analysis, either at the level of the case itself (ad hoc
balancing, in the U.S. terminology) or at the level of devising the appropriate
rule (categorical balancing).
Thickening the rule-set is a bit more complicated, and probably cannot be
described in general terms but only with reference to speciﬁc problems. So, in
the crush video case, the Court should not have resisted creating a new category
of uncovered speech, but should have adopted a functional analysis when pre-
sented with arguments in favor of doing so. And, in the funeral protest case, the
Court should have acknowledged that the interests at stake when someone
intentionally inﬂicts emotional distress on a private person, even through dis-
cussion of a public matter, are different from those at stake when the target is a
public ﬁgure.
68
The obvious prescription for pathological rule-iﬁcation is the reintroduction
of some degree of complexity into the applicable doctrine. Here I sketch three
possibilities, all inspired by constitutional concepts more common in Europe
66 In the U.S. literature, there is something of a confusion between ad hoc balancing, which ordinarily
is the simple invocation of a standard to evaluate the constitutionality of a regulation of primary
behavior, and categorical balancing, which operates on the next higher level where rules to regulate
primary behavior are deﬁned.
67 For recent examples, see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Missouri v. Frye, 132
S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
68 If I am right in describing these cases as presenting new problems, we can expect that rule-iﬁcation
will set in as experience accumulates. But, I think, we have beneﬁted from the experience of working
out what the right rules are, rather than simply assuming that the rules developed to deal—probably
quite adequately—for familiar problems are necessarily suitable for these new ones.
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 than in the United States: setting some other constitutional right against the
First Amendment, using proportionality on a case-by-case basis, and using
proportionality at the level of case types or classiﬁcations of utterances.
(A) The ﬁrst possibility builds on established doctrine where vindicating the
First Amendment threatens to infringe another constitutional right. The stand-
ard example is the “free press/fair trial” conﬂict, in which the dissemination of
information otherwise protected against regulation raises a high risk that a
defendant’s right to a fair trial will be infringed, for example by adverse pub-
licity that cannot be cured through careful screening of jurors and the like.
69
The doctrinal solution is balancing: after extended consideration of alternatives
to preventing the dissemination of information, the trial judge must balance the
risk to the defendant’s right to a fair trial against the public interest in acquiring
information.
70
European constitutionalists would readily recognize a competing constitu-
tional right in the right to human dignity.
71 They would see it obviously impli-
cated in Snyder, and the doctrine of human dignity would treat it as implicated
in the self-degradation of crush-video purchasers in Stevens.
72 But, the U.S.
Constitution does not directly recognize human dignity as a right,
73 although
one can ﬁnd suggestions that the concept of human dignity ought to inform the
69 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
70 It is probably worth emphasizing that the conﬂict here is between two constitutional rights, not
between a constitutional right and some interests protected to some extent by another constitutional
right. The standard U.S. example is hate speech regulation, conceptualized as a conﬂict between a
First Amendment right and interests in equality that are not themselves constitutionally guaranteed
in the context of, for example, private harassing speech. Where rights conﬂict with (mere) interests,
the rights necessarily prevail. Were the government to be under a constitutional duty to promote
equality, a question that depends on one’s understanding of the state action doctrine, we would have
a right-versus-right conﬂict to be resolved by balancing. For a good explication, see Michelman
1989.
71 European constitutionalists have a more robust concept of informational privacy than that used in
the United States, though I am uncertain whether even a robust concept of informational privacy
would protect the information in Sorrell. The candidates for privacy protection are patients and their
prescribing physicians. The patients would clearly have a decent informational-privacy claim, but
the information in Sorrell was anonymized as to them. I am not sure whether the physicians would
have a robust informational-privacy claim as to the number of prescriptions they wrote for speciﬁc
drugs, given their ability to decline to meet with the drug companies’ detailers.
72 Forsome relevant cases, see Laskey v. UnitedKingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39 (1997) (ﬁnding no human
rights violation in a prosecution for consensual sado-masochism); Views of the Human Rights
Committee, Communication No. 854/1999 (submitted by Manuel Wackenheim) (ﬁnding no
human rights violation in the prohibition of “dwarf tossing”, where the person being tossed con-
sents to and earns money from participating in the activity).
73 For discussions, see Rao 2011; Jackson 2004.
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 speciﬁcation of the content of other constitutional rights.
74 Were the Court
willing to move even a slight distance from strong rule-iﬁcation toward a mar-
ginally more complex rule-set, the idea of human dignity might support dif-
ferent results in Stevens and Snyder.
(B) A second possibility is the application of a proportionality test on a
case-by-case basis. Passages in Snyder suggest that the fact that the outrageous
comments dealt with a matter of public concern were not entirely dispositive.
75
Here the only observation worth making is that the spectrum of doctrinal
possibilities stretches from rule-iﬁcation to case-speciﬁc balancing, and that
even weak instrumental considerations might counsel against case-speciﬁc
balancing.
(C) Finally, there is the possibility ﬂagged by the functional approach offered
by the United States in Stevens—proportionality at the level of types of cases.
The Court’s response to that possibility was plainly inadequate, criticizing
case-speciﬁc balancing and applying those criticisms to case-type balancing
without recognizing the difference between the techniques.
76 On a generous
reading, the Court’s concern was not with case-type balancing itself, but with
the identiﬁcation of case-types as to which proportionality analysis would
apply. That is, it was concerned that a functional test focusing on the contri-
bution a class of utterances makes to discovering truth (appropriately deﬁned)
would lend itself to misapplication by other public ofﬁcials. Perhaps so, but I
have argued that the Court failed to make the case for its approach.
4. CONCLUSION
Rule-iﬁcation does not mean that the Court’s analyses in the cases discussed
here were doctrinally innovative or extreme applications of existing doctrine.
Nor does it mean that the outcomes the Court reached are indefensible.
77
74 For an example, see Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding unconstitutional the impos-
ition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on an offender who
committed a non-homicide offense when a juvenile).
75 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220 (“the reach of our opinion here is limited by the particular facts before
us.”). See also id. at 1222 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“To uphold the application of state law in these
circumstances would punish Westboro for seeking to communicate its views on matters of public
concern without proportionately advancing the State’s interest in protecting its citizens against
severe emotional harm.”).
76 Although the government’s position could hardly have been more clear.
77 For example, the statute in Stevens was overbroad, though whether it was overbroad enough to
violate the Court’s overbreadth standard is a more difﬁcult question. If it is overbroad, Stevens’s
conviction should indeed have been vacated. And, perhaps courts should reﬁne the “outrageous-
ness” instruction given the jury in Snyder v. Phelps to reduce the risk of de facto viewpoint
128 ~ Tushnet: The First Amendment and Political Risk
 
a
t
 
E
r
n
s
t
 
M
a
y
r
 
L
i
b
r
a
r
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
M
u
s
e
u
m
 
C
o
m
p
 
Z
o
o
l
o
g
y
,
 
H
a
r
v
a
r
d
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
o
n
 
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
 
2
,
 
2
0
1
2
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
j
l
a
.
o
x
f
o
r
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
s
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 A rule-iﬁed constitutional doctrine, by its nature, is unresponsive to the em-
pirical fact that the risks speech creates vary along several dimensions. Such
unresponsiveness might be justiﬁed on the kinds of institutional grounds I have
explored in this article.
It may be worth ending on a skeptical note. Justice Hugo Black was com-
mitted to the most simple rule system possible: “No law means no law.” The
current Court is committed to a somewhat thicker rule system. Between the
Court’s system and case-speciﬁc all-things-considered judgments lie many
other rule systems, some slightly thicker than the Court’s, some a great deal
thicker. I have suggested that the Court could have achieved more socially
desirable results in Snyder, Stevens, and Sorrell with a rule system that was
only modestly thicker than the one the Court adopted. I believe that the
Court’s position on First Amendment issues raises the question: why a quite
thin rule system rather than an only modestly thicker one? Answering that
question will, I think, require connecting First Amendment theory to general
constitutional theory in what I believe would be productive ways.
78
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